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1. Introduction
In 2013, authors of sound recordings will have their first
opportunity to exercise their right to terminate assignments made to
record companies. Congress and the Supreme Court have yet to settle
just who may claim authorship in sound recordings. Record
companies have responded to this uncertainty by including language
in standard recording contracts purporting to declare sound
recordings made under the contract works made for hire, such that
authorship would vest initially in the record company itself. If sound
recordings fit within the scope of a work made for hire, these
recording contracts would seal the deal that the record company is
the author for copyright purposes. However, the contractual
provisions alone will not be enough to confer work-for-hire status on
sound recordings. Once again, record companies have anticipated this
problem by also including standard language that, alternative to the
work-for-hire status, assigns the rights in the sound recording to the
record company in perpetuity. However, the termination right is not
one that can be contractually waived, so these boiler plate provisions
will only remain effective for thirty-five years, after which the true
authors, the performers and producers, have the opportunity to
terminate the assignment (or renegotiate the assignment).
This article is designed not only to expose the problems
associated with the possibility that performers and producers will be
able to terminate these assignments beginning in 2013, but also to
propose some workable solutions. Part II will look at the origins of
U.S. copyright law to set the stage for the underlying rationales for
copyright protection. Part III will tackle the fundamental question of
who is the author of a sound recording, including the problems of
works made for hire and joint authorship. Part IV will propose
solutions for what could be a fast-approaching maelstrom of litigation
regarding rights in sound recordings. Hopefully, this article will serve
as a catalyst for industry players as well as members of Congress to
take the situation seriously and take the steps necessary to avoid the
lockdown and disruption that could occur as a result of terminations
and lengthy renegotiations.
II. Background and Historical Perspective
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
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Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' The first
copyright laws in the United States originated, in part, from an
examination of and a borrowing from the English Statute of Anne
and early state-enacted copyright statutes . As a direct result of the
perceived weaknesses and underlying goals of those sources, the
"Framers explicitly chose to place 'exclusive rights' in creative works
into the hands of 'authors,' and simultaneously rejected publishers,
disseminators, guilds, or industry as primary rights holders."3 As such,
the framers acknowledged and memorialized one of the original
purposes for creating copyright protection in the United States-to
provide economic incentives for authors while preventing ownership
of copyrights from vesting in the companies that owned the printing
presses (or, in this case, the recording studios).
A. What is an Author?
Though the Constitution does not define "author," the United
States Supreme Court has stepped up and defined the term as "he to
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker., 4 The Supreme
Court has also added that a "modicum" of originality must be shown
to constitute authorship in a work.' The definition seems straight
forward enough, but in the context of sound recordings-as will be
shown-the question of authorship is actually quite complex and
uncertain.
B. Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings
Prior to 1971, musical compositions were protected by copyright,6
but sound recordings embodying those musical compositions were
not. However, after ten years of discussion between Congress and
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Marci A. Hamilton, Historical and Philosophical Underpinnings of the Copyright
Clause, 5 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW OCCASIONAL PAPERS 4, 8 (1999);
Copyright Act 1709, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
3. The United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Works Made for
Hire: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 257 (2000) [hereinafter Hearings] (Prepared Statement of Marci
A. Hamilton, Law Professor).
4. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
5. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (citing The Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (holding that the Constitutional grant of copyright
protection for "authors" for their "writings" requires independent creation and a
minimum amount of creativity)).




the record industry8 and amidst growing concerns over piracy and lost
revenues, Congress passed the Sound Recordings Act of 1971
("SRA"). 9 The SRA announced that "the copyrightable work
comprised of the aggregation of sounds" is "clearly within the scope
of 'writings of an author' capable of protection under the
Constitution. ' ' 0
Because the primary motivation for enacting the SRA was to
protect against the economic and creative harm caused by the pirating
of records," the copyright protection granted for sound recordings
only included rights of distribution and physical reproduction. 2 In
other words, the independent creation of even identical-sounding
sound recordings, for example, does not constitute infringement of
the copyrights in a sound recording, though such independent
creation would constitute an infringement of other kinds of
copyrightable works. 3 In 1995, Congress added a public performance
right for digital transmissions of sound recordings under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1995 in an effort to maintain and
strengthen the protections against piracy. 14 Though Congress has
made clear its intention that sound recordings be afforded copyright
protections, the question remains as to who receives those copyright
protections.
II. Who is the Author of a Sound Recording?
Perhaps in an effort to clarify who would receive copyrights in
sound recordings after granting those protections, Congress did state
that "performers, arrangers, and recording experts are needed to
produce [a] finished creative work in the form of a distinctive sound
8. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 79 (Prepared Statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights).
9. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
10. H.R. REP. No. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1570.
11. Id. at 1567.
12. Id. at 1578.
13. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004)
(stating that even though an artist would need a compulsory license to record the
underlying musical composition, as long as the music was independently created, there
would be no infringement of the sound recording); see generally John R. Kettle, III,
Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer: Global Harmonization-and the Need for
Congress to Get in Step with a Full Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 12
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1041 (2002).
14. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (1995).
recording."' 5 The Copyright Office has also stated that "generally,
copyright protection extends to two elements in a sound recording:
(1) the contribution of the performer(s) whose performance is
captured and (2) the contribution of the person or persons
responsible for capturing the sounds to make the final recording.
1 6
Despite these somewhat helpful elaborations, the fact remains that
the standard recording contract provides that sound recordings will
be works made for hire, with authorship vesting in the record
company. That notion seems wholly contrary to the original goals of
American copyright law of providing an incentive for artists to create
and granting those artists rights and protections from companies that
own the presses or studios. However, because neither Congress nor
the Supreme Court has provided a definitive scope for authorship of
sound recordings, industry players continue to use the definition that
most benefits them: works for hire is best for the record company,
sole authorship is best for the performer, and joint-authorship is best
for the producer. This multiplicity of self-serving viewpoints is exactly
what could lead to heated battles over authorship and termination
rights in 2013.
A. Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire
As outlined above, neither Congress nor the Copyright Office
has determined exactly which contributors might be considered
authors in a sound recording; rather, Congress intentionally decided
to leave such a determination to "the employment relationship and
bargaining among the interests involved."' 7 This leaves the door open
to the argument that sound recordings can be considered works made
for hire. Examining the evolution of the works made for hire doctrine
will put the sound recording authorship debate into context.
1. Development of the Works Made for Hire Doctrine
The Supreme Court first acknowledged the work made for hire
idea in 1903, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.8 Following
on the heels of that landmark case, the work made for hire doctrine
15. H.R. REP. No. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1569.
16. U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 56, Copyright Registration for Sound Recordings,
July, 2008, at 1.
17. H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1570.
18. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co, 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903) (holding that
"[t]here was evidence warranting the inference that the designs belonged to the plaintiffs,
they having been produced by persons employed and paid by the plaintiffs in their
establishment to make those very things").
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first appeared in legislation in the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act).' 9
The work-for-hire provision of the 1909 Act defined "author" as
including "an employer in the case of works made for hire," though
the term "works made for hire" was not defined. ° After Congress
passed the 1909 Act, courts began to construe broadly the work-for-
hire provision, ultimately finding that any commissioned work would
be a work made for hire, regardless of the employer/employee
relationship.2'
In response to the expansive judicial reading of the 1909 Act,
Congress provided a much more detailed definition of works made
for hire and narrowed its scope in the Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976
Act").2 Under section 101 of the 1976 Act, a work can be a work
made for hire either (1) as a "work prepared by an employee within
the scope of employment"; or (2) as "a work specially ordered or
commissioned," provided that a written document signed by both
parties designates it as a work made for hire and the work is one of
the nine enumerated categories. The nine categories include works
created: "as a contribution to a collective work, as part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a
test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas., 23 According to the
legislative history, the nine categories represent a compromise that
"in effect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned works
that can be considered 'works made for hire' under certain
circumstances.
24
Concerned that sound recordings, because not specifically
enumerated in the nine categories, would not be considered works for
hire, the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA")
began lobbying Congress to add sound recordings to the list.25 In 1999,
Congress sneakily added a "technical amendment," buried deep
19. Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 superseded by Copyright Act of 1976.
20. Id.; see also Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive
Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 194-95 (2001)
[hereinafter LaFrance, Joint Authors].
21. LaFrance, Joint Authors, supra note 20, at 211-12.
22. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 557 (2d Cir. 1995); 17 U.S.C. §
101 (2000).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
24. Hearings, supra note 3, at 263 (Prepared Statement of Ann E. Chaitovitz,
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists) (discussing 1976 Act House
Report).
25. Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 375, (2002) [hereinafter LaFrance, Sound Recordings].
within an unrelated section of the Intellectual Property
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, which purported to
add sound recordings to the enumerated categories eligible for work-
for-hire status.26 Immediately, Congress was faced with harsh
criticisms from recording artists and the media, including accusations
that the amendment was the product of a conspiracy between
Congress and the RIAA.27 A great deal of authority also decried the
"technical amendment" as a drastic substantive change that deserved,
at the very least, open public debate among potentially affected
industry players.8 Congress quickly responded by agreeing to hear
testimony from the RIAA, recording artists, and copyright experts,
and within six months it repealed the so called "technical
amendment."2 9 In so doing, Congress restored the works made for
hire provision to its status quo ante, encompassing only employee
works or contracted works within one of the nine originally
enumerated categories.
2. Works Made for Hire: The Employment Provision
Under the first section of the works made for hire provision, a
work can be deemed a work made for hire if an employee creates the
work within the scope of his or her employment. The 1976 Act,
however, does not specifically delineate what is meant by "employee"
or "employment." The Supreme Court, in Community Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, interpreted the terms in the 1976 Act to mean the
"conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-
law agency doctrine."30 The Court also articulated thirteen factors for
courts to use when determining the employment status of the parties
involved.3' The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
26. Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, app. I-S. 1948, § 1011(d), 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-544 (repealed 2000).
27. Peter J. Strand, What a Short Strange Trip It's Been: Sound Recordings and the
Work Made for Hire Doctrine, 18 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 12 (2000).
28. Hearings, supra note 3 at 22 (Prepared Statement of Rep. Howard H. Berman).
29. Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, app. I-S. 1948, § 1011(d), 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-544 (repealed 2000).
30. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989).
31. Id. at 751-52 (enumerating the factors as follows: "[the] hiring party's right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished ... ; the skill
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the
duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over
when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and
paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
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Circuit, in Aymes v. Bonelli, simplified the thirteen-factor Reid test by
carving out what it considered to be the five most significant
elements: "(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and
means of creating; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of
employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5)
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party."32 The Reid and Aymes cases and their progeny
established that the typical recording artist signed to a record label is
not an employee creating works within the scope of his or her
employment; instead, recording artists are independent contractors
for the purposes of the 1976 Act.33
3. Works Made for Hire: The Specially Commissioned Provision
Under the second section of the works made for hire provision, a
work can be deemed a work made for hire if it is commissioned and
falls within one of the nine enumerated categories. Because artists
generally will not be deemed employees for the purposes of the 1976
Act as described above, the record industry's best argument that
sound recordings should be works made for hire is that such sound
recordings are specially ordered or commissioned works under the
second prong of the works made for hire provision. Sound recordings,
quite clearly, are not specifically enumerated as one of the works
eligible for work-for-hire status, so the argument in favor of work-for-
hire status hangs on whether sound recordings could fit the definition
of one of the other enumerated categories of eligible works.
a. Judicial Interpretation: Sound Recordings Not Enumerated
It appears that courts have reached a consensus that sound
recordings do not fit within the second prong of the works made for
hire provision and so cannot be works made for hire unless an
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party").
32. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
33. See Kathryn Starshak, It's the End of the World as Musicians Know It, Or Is It?
Artists Battle the Record Industry and Congress To Restore Their Termination Rights in
Sound Recordings, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 71, 95-105 (2001); Ulloa v. Universal Music &
Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 414-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that because a
vocalist was not an employee under the Reid and Aymes tests and because there was no
written agreement, the work was not a work made for hire); Mark H. Jaffe, Defusing the
Time Bomb Once Again-Determining Authorship in a Sound Recording, 53 J.,
COPYRIGHT. SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 139, 164 (2005-2006) (discussing the Reid and Aymes
principles and determining that performers and producers of a sound recording "cannot
reasonably be determined to be employees").
employee prepared the works within the scope of his or her
employment.3' The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit first addressed the issue in 1997 in Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess
Broadcasting Services." In that case, the Fifth Circuit found that
sound recordings are ineligible for work made for hire status when
created by an independent contractor, because they are not included
within any of the enumerated categories for commissioned works.36
Two years later, the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey echoed the Lulirama holding in Ballas v. Tedesco by
finding that a commissioned sound recording was not a work made
for hire, because sound recordings are not among the nine
enumerated categories.37 The United States District Court for the
D.C. District followed suit when it rejected the argument that,
because it was standard industry practice, a company owned a
commissioned sound recording created by an independent
contractor. 38 That court cited both Lulirama and Ballas in concluding
that a sound recording would only qualify as a work made for hire by
satisfying the Reid test under the employment prong of the 1976 Act.39
These cases indicate that courts are unwilling to adopt a bright line
rule that all sound recordings created under a recording contract can
be works made for hire absent definitive legislative action-i.e., not
mere "technical amendments"-to establish sound recordings as an
enumerated category eligible for work-for-hire status.
b. Qualification under One of the Nine Categories
Though sound recordings are not explicitly enumerated in the list
of eligible categories in the second prong of the works made for hire
provision, some scholars and industry players argue that sound
recordings could still qualify under one of the other enumerated
categories.4" Some argue that sound recordings may be eligible under
34. See, e.g., Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999) (stating that
sound recordings cannot be works made for hire because sound recordings "do not fit
within any of the nine enumerated categories"); Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 1999) (stating that sound recordings cannot be works for hire
because "a sound recording does not fit within any of the nine categories").
35. Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 878-79 (5th Cir. 1997).
36. Id. at 877.
37. Ballas, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
38. Staggers, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
39. Id. at 64.
40. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03
(Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2004) (stating that for a sound recording to qualify for
20081 GET READY 'CAUSE HERE THEY COME
136 HASTINGS COMM[ENT L.J. [31:1
the category of contributions to a collective work." Section 101 of the
1976 Act defines a collective work as "a work, such as a periodical
issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions,
constituting separate and independent works themselves, are
assembled into a collective whole."42 Generally albums are made of
more than one song recording, so they could be considered collective
works, and so they could qualify as works made for hire.43 Because
albums probably do technically fit the definition of a collective work,
this may be the strongest argument the recording industry has to
establish sound recordings as works made for hire.
Some also argue that sound recordings could be eligible for
works made for hire status under the compilation category." Section
101 of the 1976 Act defines a compilation as "a work formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting




Because there are many elements of copyrightable expression found
in sound recordings, they could plausibly be considered
compilations.4 ' However, an album usually consists of an assortment
of newly recorded material, not preexisting works.4 ' As such, most
albums would not fit the definition of a compilation.
Still others argue that sound recordings may fit the definition of
specially commissioned works made for hire under the audiovisual
works category. Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines audiovisual
works as "works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices
protection as a work made for hire, "it must be shoe-horned within one of the other
categories").
41. See Stephen Adams, Note, Copyright Issues for Sound Recordings of Volunteer
Performers, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 119, 143-44 (2005); Jaffe, supra note 33, at 165
(discussing Professor Goldstein's argument that each song featured on an album could be
considered a contribution to a collective work).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
43. U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 56, Copyright Registration for Sound Recordings,
July, 2008, at 3 (acknowledging that some sound recordings might fit the definition of a
collective work).
44. See John P. Strohm, Comment, Writings in the Margin (of Error): The Authorship
Status of Sound Recordings under United States Copyright Law, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 127,
145-46 (2003-2004).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
46. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
47. Starshak, supra note 33, at 108.
48. See Strohm, supra note 44, at 146-50.
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such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
4 9
An audiovisual work must have a visual component, while sound
recordings do not. Many albums, such as so-called "enhanced" CDs,,°
may fit this definition because they incorporate visual images while
playing the audio. 1 However, if the sound recording is created
independently and later incorporated with a visual component, as is
generally the case with enhanced CDs, the resulting audiovisual work
will be a derivative work and will thus not affect the characterization
or works for hire status of the sound recording itself. 2 Thus,
audiovisual works and sound recordings are distinct categories of
works. The intentional enumeration of specific and exclusive
categories in the second prong of the works made for hire provision
would be rendered meaningless if the category of "audiovisual
works," or any of the other specifically enumerated categories, could
completely encompass the entirely separate realm of sound
recordings as well. 3
4. Implications for Termination Rights
If Congress or the courts do determine that sound recordings can
be works made for hire-either by including sound recordings within
one of the already enumerated categories or by adding sound
recordings to the list-there will be severe implications for
termination rights. The author, and so the owner, of any copyright
may transfer his or her rights "in whole or in part by any means of
conveyance.54 Furthermore, section 203 of the 1976 Act grants to
authors the right to terminate any such conveyance and retain full
rights in their work thirty-five years after the time of the transfer.55
The author's right of termination cannot be waived, so any
contractual provision purporting to divest the author of the right to
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
50. Donald Passman describes an enhanced CD as follows: "a normal album when
played on your stereo. But when put into your computer, it's magically transformed into
(1) an audio album that can sound relatively lousy through one-inch computer speakers;
and (2) a device that displays one or two mediocre-looking videos, copies or reviews,
interviews, lyrics, and so forth." DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 175 (2000).
51. Id.
52. See LaFrance, Sound Recordings, supra note 25, at 399.
53. Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 878 (5th Cir. 1997).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2000).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2000).
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terminate his or her conveyance is void.56 Once an assignment is
terminated, the author(s) regains the full measure of copyrights and
may assign those rights to someone else, such as a different record
label.57 Perhaps more importantly, the author may use the termination
right as a bargaining chip to renegotiate with the original assignee for
a new contract with more favorable terms.58 After thirty-five years,
the artist and his or her repertoire are more established, and so the
artist will have greater bargaining power to renegotiate a more
beneficial agreement upon termination of the initial assignment.
Thus, the right to terminate the transfer of a copyright is arguably the
most important right available to an author, especially a fledgling
recording artist who has no leverage to bargain for more favorable
terms in the initial recording contract.59
With works made for hire, however, authorship would initially
vest in the record company. Authorship under the work made for hire
doctrine is determined not by finding the person who actually
"originated" or created the work, but by examining the employment
status of the parties involved. Because authorship in a sound
recording would vest in the record company under the work made for
hire doctrine, the artist would retain no copyrights in the sound
recording. Most notably, this would eliminate the artist's ability to
terminate, regain ownership of the copyrights, and exploit those
copyrights to his or her advantage.' °
5. Works Made for Hire and International Perspectives
Although other countries do recognize the employer as the
copyright owner when an employee creates a work within the scope
of his or her employment, the United States remains one of the few
countries to recognize the employer as the author of such a work.6
The idea of employer authorship, as recognized in the U.S. works
56. Id.
57. Corey Field, Their Master's Voice? Recording Artists, Bright Lines, and Bowie
Bonds: The Debate Over Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire, 48 J., COPYRIGHT
SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 145, 155 (2000).
58. Id.
59. LaFrance, Sound Recordings, supra note 25, at 377-78.
60. Id. at 378.
61. Hearings, supra note 3, at 115 (Statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights); see also Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural
Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 361, 363-64 (1998) (discussing the historical development of the driving
principal of protecting and fostering artistic creation in copyright laws in continental
Europe).
made for hire doctrine, is at odds with the idea of the author's moral
rights to a work, as recognized by countries such as France and
Germany.62 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Berne Convention) was amended in 1928 to promote
uniform international protections for the moral rights of authors of
literary and artistic works. 63  Despite the vastly different
underpinnings of the economic-based U.S. works made for hire
doctrine and the author-centered international moral rights doctrine,
Congress has made efforts to comply with the spirit of the
international copyright norms in the Berne Convention.6 At the very
least, these efforts should be considered when determining what the
scope of the works made for hire doctrine will be in U.S. copyright
law.65
6. Arguments for Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire
Notwithstanding the uncertain status of authorship in sound
recordings, it is standard industry practice for recording contracts to
contain a clause that the sound recordings made under the record
contract constitute works made for hire 66 or, alternatively, that the
artist transfers copyright ownership to the record company.6' Record
companies also register the recordings tracks as works made for hire
owned by the record company.6 Thus, it could be argued that the
"technical amendment" in the Intellectual Property and
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, adding sound
recordings to the list of categories eligible for works for hire status,
62. Strohm, supra note 44, at 137; Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to
Copyrighted Things (and French Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 454-55
(1999) (discussing the historical development of "driot d'auteur").
63. Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Convention: An Extended
Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 71, 73-74 (1988).
64. See 3 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02[C] (2007) (discussing
congressional enactment of the Berne Convention Implementation Act).
65. See Berne Convention Article 6bis(1) (providing that "[i]ndependently of the
author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of said rights, the author shall have
the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which shall
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.").
66. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3 at 147 (Statement of Professor Marci A.
Hamilton). Many artists who retain their rights in a sound recording also will register the
recording as a work made for hire. Id.at 122-34. (Prepared Statement of Hillary Rosen,
President and CEO of Recording Industry Association of America).
67. Id. at 203 (Statement of Jay Cooper, attorney for the Recording Artists
Coalition); M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC
189 (10th ed. 2007).
68. Id.
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really did just clarify and codify what had been standard industry
practice for years. However, contractually designating or registering a
sound recording as a work made for hire is not sufficient to make it a
work made for hire under the 1976 Act.69 Only by satisfying the
employment status tests or the specially commissioned categories
tests can the work be a work made for hire.
Some argue that for economic policy reasons, because record
labels take the initial risk when they sign new artists, sound
recordings should be considered works made for hire. 7' The work-for-
hire doctrine is arguably necessary to preserve the marketability of
sound recordings and to avoid the disruption that would occur if
artists could exercise a termination right.72 However, thirty-five years
seems a sufficient amount of time for record companies to make a
substantial return on their investments before the artist has the right
to terminate or renegotiate the terms of the initial assignment.
Others argue for work-for-hire eligibility under a "chaos theory"
because many individuals participate in the creation of a sound
recording; as such, determining the authorship status-and the
potential for rights of termination-of each contributor may be
difficult, which may trap the true creators and the record labels in
endless litigation.73 However, featured artists generally sign work-for-
hire agreements with contributing musicians and artists,74 thereby
eliminating the fear of record companies that they will be faced with
multiple termination notices and the potential for competing sound
recordings should some contributing artists grant rights to other
companies. Furthermore, if sound recordings are considered joint
works and not works for hire, record companies could contract with
69. Hearings, supra note 3, at 90 (Prepared Statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters,
Copyright Register).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 125 ("Typically, less than 15% of all sound recordings released by major
record companies will even make back their costs").
72. Id. at 129 (Prepared Statement of Hilary Rosen, President and CEO of Recording
Industry Association of America) ("Think about the disruption that would ensue if, 35
years after its creation, each of the multitudes of authors involved in each and every track
of an album could reclaim copyright ownership of that track.").
73. Id. at 180-81 (Prepared Statement of Michael Greene, President and CEO,
National Academy Recording Arts & Sciences, Inc.); Id. at 129 (Statement of Hillary
Rosen, President and CEO, Recording Industry Association of America); LaFrance,
Sound Recordings, supra note 25, at 396-97.
74. Under the same policy rationale, featured artists who sign work-for-hire
agreements with contributing musicians will not be protected against termination claims
from these contributing artists either. Hearings, supra note 3, at 181 (Statement of Michael
Greene, President and CEO, National Academy Recording Arts & Sciences, Inc.).
the featured artist or record producer such that only those parties
would be able to terminate assignments on behalf of all joint authors
to ensure that the record company will not be faced with multiple
termination notices.
7. Arguments Against Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire
The legislative history reveals that the codification of the works
made for hire doctrine involved long years of debate among
interested parties, wherein all of the proposed categories of eligible
works were discussed at length. 5 Noticeably, sound recordings were
never debated as a potential category. This could be because sound
recordings were not granted federal copyright protection until 1971,76
after the majority of the work-for-hire provision had been drafted in
1966. 77 However, copyright protection for sound recordings had been
discussed and the provisions enacted well in advance of the passage of
the 1976 Act with its work-for-hire provisionf Thus, Congress knew
that sound recordings could potentially be added to the list of
enumerated categories under the specially commissioned prong but
chose not to take action to include them in the list.
One could argue that sound recordings are so similar to films,
which can be specially commissioned works made for hire under the
audiovisual category, that they too should be included as eligible for
work-for-hire status. However, the production of films is often paid
for by the film studio, which also hires a director and actors to create
the film. 79 Dissimilarly, a record, though paid for in advance by a
record label, will ultimately be paid for out of the eventual royalties
of the artist, who has control over the recording and production of the
album.' As such, there are key distinguishing factors that lead to the
conclusion that sound recordings should not be deemed works made
for hire like films, despite some similarities between the mediums.
Others argue that the Constitution gives Congress the power to
grant authors exclusive rights in their creations, not corporate
75. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736-37.
76. See Sound Recordings Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971)
(codified as 17 U.S.C. § 102(7) (2000)).
77. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 867-68 (1987) (noting that the work-for-hire provision adopted by
the 1976 Act had not been changed since its initial drafting in 1966).
78. Sound recordings received copyright protection in 1971, before the work-for-hire
provision was enacted as part of the Copyright Act of 1976. See Sound Recordings Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 102(7) (2000)).
79. Hearings, supra note 3, at 162 (Statement of recording artist Sheryl Crow).
80. Id.
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entities.1 For example, copyright scholar Siva Vaidhyanathan has
argued that the work-for-hire doctrine marks the "real death of the
author."' Similarly, law professor Marci Hamilton has said that "the
work made for hire doctrine, which permits an employer or
commissioner to be the 'author' for copyright purposes is at odds with
the plain language of the [Copyright] Clause. It is, in reality, an end-
run around the Framers' decision to place the power over creative
works into the hands of those who created them." 3 The main thrust
of such arguments is that, should the work-for-hire doctrine become
the norm instead of the exception, it would be unconstitutional.'
At any rate, the time is ripe for Congress to open the floor for
debate once again and invite the RIAA, recording artists, producers,
and copyright experts to present arguments for and against the
legitimate inclusion (or outright, definitive exclusion) of sound
recordings in the work-for-hire category. Until Congress gives the
final statutory word, it seems that courts and industry players will
remain in limbo, only able to speculate as to the eventual
interpretation of the work-for-hire doctrine in U.S. sound recordings.
B. Authorship If Sound Recordings Are Not Works Made for Hire"'
The main concern of copyright scholars, record companies, and
artists is what rights the artists retain in a sound recording. In other
words, the threshold question is whether authorship will vest in the
record company under the work-for-hire doctrine. However, it seems
likely under the current jurisprudence that sound recordings will not
be considered works made for hire absent definitive congressional
action to add them to the list of enumerated categories."' Thus,
perhaps the more pressing issue is which artists involved in the
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see discussion supra Part II.
82. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPY WRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 101-02 (N.Y. Univ.
Press 2001).
83. Hearings, supra note 3, at 257 (Prepared Statement of Marci A. Hamilton, Law
Professor). She doesn't propose abolishing the work-for-hire doctrine altogether; instead
she advocates drawing a distinction between granting authorship status to employers
whose employees create works within the scope of their employment and independent
contractors who exercise a great deal of creative control and bear the initial expense of the
project. See id. at 257-58.
84. Id.
85. For further treatment of this specific topic, see Yours, Mine, and Ours: The Joint
Authorship Conundrum for Sound Recordings, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 525 (2008).
86. See id. at 258 (stating that the "Framers explicitly chose to place 'exclusive rights'
in creative works into the hands of 'authors,' and simultaneously rejected publishers,
disseminators, guilds, or industry as primary rights holders").
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creation of a sound recording will be considered "authors" for
copyright purposes. At first glance, it does not seem like an important
point; however, as artists attempt to terminate or renegotiate
assignments in a few years, courts will be flooded with litigation to
determine the scope of authorship, work-for-hire status, and
termination rights in sound recordings. The fact that authorship in
sound recordings, if not works made for hire, is still uncertain only
exacerbates the problem. Thus, if a clear understanding of authorship
in sound recordings can be ascertained before the issue of works
made for hire status must be decided, it seems that record companies
can avoid some of the "chaos" associated with the potential for
multiple termination notices for a single work.
1. Sole-authorship Theories
Some argue that sound recordings are absolutely not joint works,
but that the featured artist is the only one who should be able to claim
authorship status. For example, Sheryl Crow, a highly successful
recording artist and vice president of the Recording Artist Coalition,
believes that the featured artist should be considered the sole author
of a sound recording.87 In support of her argument, Crow cited the
process by which a featured artist will author a sound recording, like
the captain of a ship making decisions, about accompanying
musicians, directing engineering and production, and choosing songs
that will appear on the album as well as the title.8 However, her
argument for sole authorship completely ignores the fact that,
generally, many people, including featured artists, producers,
engineers, and background musicians, contribute creatively to the
production of an album. Additionally, the sole authorship approach
would create a disincentive for artists to collaborate and share ideas
by giving only the featured artist a claim of authorship rights.
2. Joint-authorship Theories
Precisely because many contributors are involved in the creation
of sound recordings, it seems that sound recordings should be
considered joint works. Congress has acknowledged that "performers,
arrangers, and recording experts are needed to produce [a] finished
creative work in the form of a distinctive sound recording., 89 The
87. Id. at 163-67 (Prepared Statement of recording artist Sheryl Crow) (dismissing
explicitly any claims of authorship by producers, musicians, and engineers).
88. Id.
89. H.R. REP. No. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1569.
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Copyright Office has agreed with the argument that sound recordings
should generally be considered joint works, comprised of multiple
significant contributions of authorship.9' Though a sound recording
might easily be categorized as a joint work, the question still remains
as to which participants in its production will have viable claims of
authorship in the resulting sound recording.
The language of the Copyright Act is not particularly elucidating.
Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines a joint work as a "work prepared
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole."'" The legislative history reveals that Congress used the word
"inseparable" to describe situations where the components of the
unitary whole have little or no meaning by themselves-like
paragraphs in a novel-and the word "interdependent" to describe
situations where the components could stand alone but achieve a
greater effect when combined, like the lyrics and melody of a song.92
Committee reports stated:
[A] work is "joint" if the authors collaborated with each other, or if
each of the authors prepared his or her contribution with the
knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the
contributions of other authors as "inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole." The touchstone here is the intention, at
the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or
combined into an integrated unit ....
Thus, it seems like the Act requires either that contributors actually
collaborate by working together or that contributors who work
separately have the requisite intent to combine their contributions
into a unitary whole. Though not explicit in the legislative history or
the Act itself, the use of the word "authors" seems to suggest that
each contribution to the unitary whole must be independently
copyrightable. Sound recordings generally do involve inseparable and
interdependent components contributed by multiple artists, though
90. Hearings, supra note 3, at 92-93 (Prepared Statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyright). As detailed infra at Part IV, the Copyright Office has proposed
that key contributors to the sound recording-those who contribute significant
authorship-should be deemed joint authors of a work (though mere accompanying
contributors could be classified as works made for hire).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Section 201(a) provides that "[t]he authors of a joint work
are [co-owners] of copyright in the work." Each author "obtains an undivided ownership
in the whole of the joint work, including any portion thereof." NIMMER, supra note 6, at §
6.06[A].
92. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
93. S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 103 (1975).
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not all of the artists' contributions may be deemed independently
copyrightable works.
Because joint authorship, unlike joint works, is not defined in the
copyright statute, there are many interpretations of the requirements
for joint authorship. The Register of Copyrights has stated that
independent copyrightability is required under the statutory standard
of authorship and perhaps under the Constitution as well.94 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, has
determined that merely contributing independently copyrightable
expression is not sufficient to claim joint authorship of a work, even if
other factors, such as intent to merge the work into a unitary whole,
are met.95 The court considered several factors in the determination of
joint-authorship status: (1) "[the] author 'superintend[s]' the work by
exercising control"; (2) "[the] putative coauthors make objective
manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors"; and (3) "the
audience appeal of the work turns on both contributions and the
share of each in its success cannot be appraised."96 For the Ninth
Circuit, control is the key factor.97 The Ninth Circuit's decision is
supported by the general policy of protecting authors and promoting
the progress of the arts because "[p]rogress would be retarded rather
than promoted if an author could not consult with others and adopt
their. .. [input] without sacrificing sole ownership of the work." 98
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has interpreted joint authorship as requiring a mutual intent
to share authorship as a prerequisite for a joint work.99 This
interpretation is in part based upon the so-called Goldstein approach,
which states that "[f]or a joint work to exist, each author must have
intended to create a joint work at the time he made his
contribution."'" The Goldstein approach also embodies the Ninth
Circuit's rationale that "[a] collaborative contribution will not
produce a joint work, and a contributor will not obtain a co-
94. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Moral Rights in Our
Copyright Laws: Hearing on S. 1198 and S. 1253 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 210-11 (1989)
(Statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights)).
95. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2000).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1234-35 ("absence of control is strong evidence of the absence of
coauthorship").
98. Id. at 1235.
99. Childress, 945 F.2d at 509.




ownership interest, unless the contribution represents original
expression that could stand on its own as the subject matter of
copyright."'0 ' The Second Circuit adopted the Goldstein approach
because it seemed to be the majority rule, 2 because it would prevent
people from making "spurious claims" against a sole author,'3 and
because the court believed it to be the correct balance between
copyright and contract law.'O° The Second Circuit followed the
Goldstein approach again in Thomson v. Larson." In making the
determination that Thomson was not a joint author under the
Goldstein rule, the court considered several objective factors: Larson
had held himself out to third parties as being the sole author, the
contract between Larson and the New York Theater Workshop listed
him as the sole author and gave him rights over all changes, and
Thomson was not listed as an author or co-author on the playbill.'"
The Goldstein approach is in line with the notion that the Act's use of
the word "authors" in defining joint works suggests that each
contribution must be independently copyrightable in order for a
copyright ownership interest to vest in the contributor, though the
Act and its legislative history do not seem to call for such a stringent
standard.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
adopted the somewhat different Nimmer Approach, which simply
requires more than a de minimis contribution for joint authorship
status." Unlike the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit
has held that where two contributors intend to create an indivisible
copyrightable work, each contributor will be a joint author even if the
portion he or she contributed would not be independently
copyrightable.' 8 Instead, the Seventh Circuit adopted a joint
authorship test that requires (1) an intention to create a unitary work
and (2) a more than de minimis contribution."" By closely following
101. Id. at § 4.2.1.2.
102. Childress, 954 F.2d at 505-06.
103. Id. at 507.
104. Id.
105. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1998).
106. Id. at 198, 202-05.
107. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004).
108. Id. at 658-59 (stating that it would be paradoxical not to allow anyone to claim a
copyright in a finished, copyrightable work simply because no individual contribution was
itself copyrightable).
109. Id. at 659 (adopting the Nimmer approach); see also NIMMER, supra note 6, at §
6.07; but see Erikson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1072 (7th Cir 1994) (adopting
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the statutory definition of a "joint work" in the Copyright Act, the
Nimmer approach creates a lower threshold of authorship, rewards
more artists for their contributions, provides an incentive to
collaborate, and prevents parties from taking advantage of others.
This approach also furthers the fundamental copyright goals of
promoting the arts and protecting authors "by rewarding all parties
who labor together to unite idea with form.""' It could also be argued
that this approach, by not requiring that each contribution is
independently copyrightable, grants copyright protection to ideas,
which the Act strictly forbids."1 ' However, upon reconsideration, one
can see that this concern is unfounded; for it is not each component,
but the finished unitary whole that is granted copyright protection,
with each contributor merely retaining co-ownership interest in that
final unitary work. The Nimmer approach protects contributors while
still allowing parties to contract around the default rule of joint
authorship through assignments of copyright interests or work-for-
hire agreements. "2 Thus, the Nimmer approach, as adopted by the
Seventh Circuit, seems to be more statutorily favorable, as well as a
better balance of copyright and contract interests.
3. Joint Works: Implications for Termination Rights
As explained above, the author, and so the owner, of any
copyright may transfer his or her rights "in whole or in part by any
means of conveyance.'. 3 Furthermore, section 203 of the 1976 Act
grants to authors the right to terminate any such conveyance and
retain full rights in their work thirty-five years after the time of the
transfer."' The author's right of termination cannot be waived, so any
contractual provision purporting to divest the author of the right to
terminate his or her conveyance is void."5 Where the work is a joint
work and two or more joint authors grant rights in the work, the
the Goldstein approach in finding that an actor was not a joint author because his
suggestions were not copyrightable on their own).
110. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 6.07[A][3].
111. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (denying copyright protection to "any idea,.... concept,
[or] principle,... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work").
112. Note that assignments of ownership made by contributing authors could, under
the current legal standards, be considered subject to termination as well. However, the
proposed solutions infra Part IV would ensure that key contributors would retain
authorship rights without minor contributors retaining authorship rights as well.
113. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2000).
114. Id. at § 203(a)(3).
115. Id. at § 203(a)(5).
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termination will go into effect where a majority of the authors who
executed the grant choose to terminate. 6 However, if a joint author
granted his rights in a separate conveyance, as record producers often
do, such author may terminate individually and obtain non-exclusive
rights in the work."7
Once an assignment is terminated, the author(s) regain the full
measure of copyrights and may assign those rights to someone else,
such as a different record label."8 Perhaps more importantly, the
author may use the termination right as a bargaining chip to
renegotiate with the original assignee for a new contract with more
favorable terms. " 9 Thus, the right to terminate the transfer of a
copyright is arguably the most important right available to an author,
especially a fledgling recording artist who has no leverage to bargain
for more favorable terms in the initial recording contract.'
If joint authors assigned copyrights to someone else, the record
company for example, "termination of the grant may be effected by a
majority of the authors who executed it.''. Thus, if sound recordings
are not deemed works made for hire, "the record company might be
faced with a situation in which it can be held hostage to the demands
of the individual artist who knows that he can deprive the [company]
of the exclusive right to exploit the work simply by assigning his
nonexclusive rights to another record company." '22 As such, it is in
everyone's best interest to determine the scope of joint authorship
and termination rights in sound recordings before termination notices
begin taking effect.
IV. Proposed Solutions
Copyright Register Marybeth Peters has stated that the
Copyright Office "believes that those who contribute significant
authorship to a sound recording should have the right to terminate." '123
116. Id. at § 203(a)(1).
117. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
If this author grants a new transfer of non-exclusive rights, he must make an accounting to
the other authors of any profits earned and due to them.
118. Field, supra note 57, at 155.
119. Id. After thirty-five years, the artist and his repertoire are more established and
so the artist will have greater bargaining power to renegotiate upon termination.
120. LaFrance, Sound Recordings, supra note 25, at 377-78.
121. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2000).
122. Hearings, supra note 3, at 92 (Prepared Statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters,
Copyright Register).
123. Id. at 93.
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Under her proposal, "significant authors" would be those "key
contributors" who make major contributions of copyrightable
expression, such as the featured artist or band.' As such, the best
definition of authorship in a sound recording might grant copyright
protection to those who contribute significantly, the "key
contributors," but not those who merely collaborate in some small
way. Background musicians, therefore, would not be key
contributors, though producers would be given special consideration
on a case-bay-case basis.' 25 Under the Peters Plan, contributions to
sound recordings by background contributors could fit within the
definition of works made for hire.'26 However, there would be an
exception to work-for-hire status for key contributors, who would
retain authorship of the sound recording and would have an
inalienable termination right in such sound recordings.1 27 Not only is
this approach in line with the statutory language of the Copyright Act
and standard music industry contracting practices,'28 but also it would
strike a balance between the two major theories of authorship in
sound recordings: it would maintain the collaboration-encouraging
effects of the Nimmer approach while also assuaging the concerns at
the core of the Goldstein approach.
129
The Peters Plan assuages RIAA concerns, such as the potential
for multiple terminations and re-licensing grants that would render
record labels' vaults unmarketable, however, it could also pit creator
against creator by extending copyright benefits to some but not all of
the contributing artists.'30 It could also lead to a determination that an
artist is a key contributor simply because of that artist's relative
124. Id. As such, her approach is similar to the Goldstein approach as well as the rules
promulgated in both the Second and Ninth Circuits.
125. Id. at 93-94; see, e.g., Morrill v. Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D.
Cal. 2001) (recognizing music video as a joint work between the producer and the
recording artist).
126. Hearings, supra note 3, at 93 (Prepared Statement of Marybeth Peters, Copyright
Register).
127. Id.
128. 4 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING & THE ARTS § 9:18 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2007) (referring to U.S. Copyright
Office Circular 56 ("Generally, copyright protection extends to two elements in a sound
recording: (1) the contribution of the performer(s) whose performance is captured and (2)
the contribution of the person or persons responsible for capturing and processing the
sounds to make the final recording.")).
129. See supra Part III.B(2). The Goldstein approach is concerned with protecting true
authors from spurious claims of small contributors who were not intended to be
considered co-authors and who only contribute noncopyrightable elements to a work.
130. Hearings, supra note 3, at 132 (Statement of Hilary Rosen, President and CEO of
Recording Industry Association of America).
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notoriety and, thus, bargaining power. A more established singer
would more likely be designated as one of the artists featured on a
song, and so would be more likely to have authorship status. Consider
the Ulloa case, a paradigm example of this problem where an
unknown artist was found not to be a joint-author. 3' However, many
of these supporting artists are already paid as employees and so
already fall within the work-for-hire doctrine anyway.' 32 At any rate,
the Peters Plan is a good working model that should be debated in
Congress'33 and perhaps tempered with the more lenient Nimmer
approach to joint authorship to strike the most equitable balance of
interests.
Another approach that would not require any subjective, fact-
based, case-by-case analysis of the significance of an artist's
contribution would be to alter the language of section 203. A new
section 203 could allow joint authors to designate one of the joint
recording artists as the one with authority to terminate on behalf of
all the joint authors. Alternatively, section 203 could provide that a
majority of joint recording authors would be necessary to terminate
134an assignment, even if the grants were made in separate executions.
This approach would require congressional modification of section
203 to make certain that there will not be multiple competing versions
of a work or multiple notices of termination in a single work.' This
approach would also leave the authorship status of contributing
parties to the contractual agreements between those parties, since
there is no definitive legislative or judicial rule to guide the parties.'36
As such, this approach honors contract policy and the bargaining of
the parties; however, it also ignores the supposedly inalienable nature
of termination rights and the notion that even without copyright law,
authors do have some natural claim to their works. Perhaps a
combination of the two proposed solutions would best solve the
131. Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 414-16
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that because a vocalist was not an employee under the Reid and
Aymes tests and because there was no written agreement, the work was not a work made
for hire).
132. See 2A ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING & THE ARTS § 9:80 (2d ed. 2003).
133. See Strohm, supra note 44, at 155-56.
134. Mark Jaffe, a lawyer with prior experience producing, licensing, and distributing
sound recordings, has proposed a similar plan with the goal of assuaging record
companies' fears about multiple terminations and competing sound recording distribution.
Jaffe, supra note 33, 139 n.al, 195-96.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 196-97.
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complicated problems involved if multiple joint authors are allowed
to terminate and grant competing, non-exclusive assignments.
The fact remains that Congress needs to address the scope of
authorship in sound recordings and establish firm standards for works
for hire status before courts and industry players become entangled in
litigation over termination rights. To strike the appropriate balance of
interests, perhaps Congress should adopt a combination of the two
proposed solutions to best solve the complicated problems involved if
multiple joint authors are allowed to terminate and grant competing,
non-exclusive assignments. Under the proposed amended section 203,
key contributors to a sound recording would have the authority to
designate one among them as the assignment terminator. Further, the
key contributors would be able to contract with supporting
contributors, such that any supporting contribution would be works
made for hire. Thus, record companies would be free from the
"chaos" of multiple claims for termination and duplicitous
reassignments of rights to a recording. At the same time, key
contributors would be protected from frivolous claims of authorship
of minor contributors, who may try to seek termination and
reassignment of a recording to the detriment of the true authors of a
work. This approach also safeguards the artists' all important
termination rights, by eliminating the possibility that all sound
recordings will be eligible for work-for-hire status.
V. Conclusion
The abundance of scholarly works discussing the intermingling
issues of authorship and termination rights, and the dearth of
definitive guidance from Congress, signifies the gravity of the
situation. In 2013, authors of sound recordings will have their first
opportunity to exercise their right to terminate assignments made to
record companies. Without a firm standard from Congress, industry
players will not know how to react to those termination notices, and
courts faced with the inevitable resulting litigation will be forced to
speculate as to congressional intent. None of the proposed solutions is
perfect; each has been presented as a means to point out the various
arguments for and against considering sound recordings under works
made for hire, sole authorship, and joint authorship theories.
Ultimately, the onus rests with Congress to decide, after legitimate
debate among all interested parties, whether to include sound
recordings in the list of enumerated categories for commissioned
works for hire. Until then, industry players should prepare for the
possibility that an even stickier issue will arise-that of whether all
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contributing artists have a claim to joint authorship status. If sound
recordings are not to be considered works made for hire, the potential
for multiple notices of termination from multiple joint authors only
exacerbates the problem. Rest assured that all contributing artists
with a potential claim of authorship in a sound recording will be back
to claim that right in 2013, whether or not the music industry is ready
for them.
